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The  Sole  Condition 
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The  Sole  Condition 

of  Permanent  Peace 


Rousseau  thought  it  a  great  joke  that,  after  the  King  of  France 
failed  in  an  attempt  to  insure  general  peace,  the  Abbe  de  St.  Pierre 
tried  to  do  the  same  thing  by  writing  a  book.  The  times  have 
changed,  and  we  can  do  many  things  beyond  the  power,  and  beyond 
the  dreams,  of  any  King  of  France.  The  publication  of  the  per- 
sonal ideas  of  St.  Pierre,  Penn,  Kant  and  others  was  indeed  rather 
futile;  but  the  formulation  by  many  men  of  the  common  ambition 
of  most  men  must  help  our  common  aims  grow  into  facts.  The 
peoples  of  the  larger  part  of  the  World  now  control  their  own 
political  destinies.  Very  nearly  all  of  the  people  of  the  World  now 
want  peace.  The  difference  in  the  times  is  that  the  peace-wanters 
now  rule.  What  the  people  of  the  World  almost  unanimously 
want,  they  can  have,  if  they  will.  And  the  charge  which  the 
pacifists  indignantly  denied  a  couple  of  years  ago,  that  they  wanted 
peace  at  any  price,  lies  against  almost  all  of  us  by  this  time. 

England  and  France  have  already  invested  a  third  of  their 
national  wealth  in  the  struggle  for  peace,  and  after  their  good 
money  and  better  blood,  we  are  sending  ours.  So  far  as  wealth 
is  concerned,  and  life  too,  we  are  indeed  for  peace  at  any  price; 
it  is  a  carte  blanche  order.  As  is  fitting  in  a  carte  blanche  order, 
the  specifications  are  fairly  stringent.  The  peace  for  which  we  are 
paying  whatever  the  price  may  turn  out  to  be  must  be  real,  rea- 
sonable, and  in  prospect  durable.  A  truce,  or  the  mere  form  of 
peace,  such  "peace"  as  Europe  had  before  it  began  to  war  openly, 
need  not  be  tried  again. 

Because  Germany,  with  her  spies,  her  intrigue  and  mischief- 
making,  her  armament,  and  all  the  paraphernalia,  accessories  and 
consequences  of  her  selfish  and  ambitious  Weltpolitik,  was  chiefly 
responsible  for  the  unreality  of  recent  peace,  because  she  con- 
stantly opposed  efforts  to  approach  real  peace,  because  she  pre- 
cipitated the  World  war,   regardless  of  treaties  and  of  the  whole 

3 


572072 


The  Sole  Condition   of   Permanent   Peace. 

body  of  international  law  to  which  she  pretended  to  subscribe,  be- 
cause we  are  at  war  with  her  and  could  not,  after  the  experience  of 
Russia,  have  any  sufficient  way  of  recognizing  an  offer  of  peace 
with  the  Imperial  German  government,  even  when  what  might 
seem  to  be  one  was  presented,  and  because  parts  of  Europe  are 
today  without  government  which  can  be  trusted  to  be  responsible, 
for  all  of  these  reasons,  we  are  agreed,  among  ourselves  and  with 
the  rest  of  the  extra-germanic  World,  in  recognizing  Germany,  and 
the  chaotic  conditions  of  Germany  and  Russia,  as  the  immediate 
obstacles  to  peace.  Our  immediate  task,  then,  beside  which  all 
others  are  insignificent  for  the  present,  is  to  get  rid  of  these 
obstacles.  There  is  only  one  apparent  way  to  do  this,  and  that  is 
by  the  maintenance  of  force  so  great  and  so  persistent  that  it  may 
not  be  resisted.  This  is  the  only  pacifist  policy  there  is,  unless  we 
are  really  ready  to  turn  the  other  cheek;  and  even  that  alternative 
was  never  elaborated  far  enough  to  include  directions  after  the  head 
is  cut  off. 

Sooner  or  later,  the  obstacles  will  be  disposed  of.  In  the 
meantime,  not  letting  consideration  of  more  remote  aims  distract 
efforts  from  the  cremation  of  German  and  Bolshevik  ambition,  we 
may  well  take  steps  to  establish  a  system  of  World  politics  which 
will  make  another  great  war  unlikely  or  impossible. 

In  the  first  place,  we  need  to  formulate  our  agreement  on  the 
nature,  terms  and  conditions  of  peace.  The  peace  we  and  our  allies 
aspire  to  must  be  satisfactory  to  as  large  a  part  of  humanity  as 
any  one  set  of  terms  can  satisfy.  It  must  be  founded  on  terms 
likely  to  become  more  satisfactory  as  time  passes.  It  must  be  on 
terms  adjusted  in  advance  to  such  economic,  political  and  social 
progress  as  reasonably  may  be  foreseen,  and  permitting  further 
peaceful  adjustment  of  the  same  kind.  It  must  be  as  just  as 
possible  and  as  permanent  as  possible.  These  basic,  general  con- 
siderations must  underly  and  take  precedence  of  any  efforts  to 
guard  the  interests  and  aspirations  of  single  groups  of  people, 
even  groups  of  considerable  size.  If  we  make  the  conservation  of 
the  interests,  aspirations  or  several  supposed  rights  of  many  races 
and  nations  the  chief  consideration  in  arranging  conditions  of  peace, 
we  will  thereby  conserve  the  sole  probable  cause  of  war.  Recog- 
nition of  this  fact  does  not  impair  the  justice  of  our  cause  in  this 
war,  any  more  than  it  does  the  justice  of  Belgium's  position.  But 
it  is  a  fact  which  must  have  its  share  of  attention  when  we  under- 
take to  provide  real  and  permanent  peace. 


The   Sole   Condition   of   Permanent   Peace, 

There  are  two  historical  facts  of  especial  significance  in  any 
attempt  to  devise  conditions  of  lasting  peace.  The  first  is  that, 
within  limits  fixed  primarily  by  the  effectiveness  of  means  of  travel 
and  communication,  and  only  secondarily  by  differences  in  race, 
language,  religion  and  customs,  internal  peace  has  been  easier  to 
maintain  than  external  peace.  Empires  have  broken  up  under 
attack  from  without,  but  never  from  internal  causes  independent  of 
the  difficulty  of  communication;  and  difficulty  of  this  kind  hardly 
survives  at  all.  The  stability  of  the  British  Empire  proves  that  there 
is  no  longer  a  limit  to  the  size  of  empires  internally  secure.  If 
Russia  had  been  for  a  decade  a  part  of  the  British  Empire  or  of 
the  United  States,  she  would  never  have  collapsed.  The  most  im- 
portant move  of  our  allies  since  the  war  began  has  been  unification 
of  counsel  and  effort. 

The  second  of  these  historic  facts,  or  perhaps  only  a  corollary 
of  the  first,  is  that  the  number  of  independent  states  tends  to 
diminish.  Within  our  own  times,  some  states,  previously  really  in- 
dependent, have  been  absorbed  and  assimilated,  others  have  lost 
nominal  independence,  and  still  others  have  been  reduced  to  the 
latter  condition;  while  no  state  has  acquired  real  independence 
within  forty  years,  unless  Norway  did  so  by  acquiring  a  king  in 
severalty.  The  disappearance  of  independent  states  may  be  by  con- 
quest, as  in  the  case  of  the  Transvaal,  or  due  to  the  obvious  futil- 
ity of  resistence,  as  in  the  case  of  Korea,  or  by  choice,  as  by  the 
request  of  Hawaii.  What  of  the  changes  brought  by  this  war, 
such  as  the  overrunning  of  Montenegro  and  the  establishment  of 
Ukrainia,  will  survive  the  war,  is  uncertain.  But  there  is  no  reason 
to  doubt  at  all  that  the  tendency  of  small  states  to  be  merged  into 
greater  ones  will  continue,  while  small  states  remain  available. 

There  is  likewise  no  evident  reason  to  anticipate  that  states  so 
situated  that  one  can  war  on  another,  with  hope  of  advantage*  in 
either  direction,  will  ever  abstain  through  great  periods  of  time 
from  doing  so.  A  part  of  the  causes  of  past  wars  are  certainly  dis- 
appearing; but  the  interests  of  nations  will  be  able  to  conflict  as 
long  as  the  nations  survive,  and  it  is  hard  to  imagine  any  complete 
scheme  by  which  conflicting  interests  of  independent  and  coordinate 
states  can  be  kept  from  occasionally  being  settled  by  the  test 
of  war. 

Still  another  practical  certainly,  to  which  we  may  not  close  our 
eyes,  is  the  fact  that  if  wars  recur  they  cannot  always  be  restricted 
in  violence  or  savagery.     Rules  may  govern  the  back-yard  rows  of 


The   Sole   Condition   of   Permanent    Peace, 

little  poweis,  afraid  to  offend  the  sentiment  of  a  neutral  world 
which  might  suppress  them;  but  in  a  world-war,  liice  the  present 
one,  the  only  limits  to  be  trusted  are  the  temporary  limitations 
of  the  destructive  power  of  science.  While  war  goes  on,  the  science 
of  destruction  speeds  up,  at  the  same  time  that  the  decent  senti- 
ments which  tend  to  hold  control  in  peace  are  gradually  crushed 
out.  The  World  was  horrified  beyond  its  worst  dream  in  1914; 
and  that  was  before  poisonous  gases  were  used,  before  neutral 
women  and  children  were  deliberately  drowned  at  sea,  before 
nurses  were  murdered  and  before  hospitals  began  to  be  sought  out 
for  bombing.  We  have  no  substantial  basis  for  hope  that,  if  con- 
ditions for  another  World  war  are  permitted  to  mature,  the  horrors 
will  not  be  far  worse.  Methods  of  far  more  wholesale  slaughter  are 
already  almost  within  reach.  How  can  we  sanely  doubt  that  on 
occasion  those  who  can  will  use  them?  Extermination  has  been 
practiced  in  the  past,  even  by  those  from  whom  we  derive  our  re- 
ligion. It  has  been  attempted  in  the  present  war,  and  not  in  Ser- 
bia and  Armenia  alone;  "bleeding  France  white"  means  as  nearly 
that  as  it  can. 

The  recent  unbridled  tumult  in  Petrograd  and  Odessa  was 
graphically  described  by  Thucidides,  who  staged  it  at  Corcyra.  The 
next  presentation  may  be  in  Constantinople,  or  Vienna,  or  Essen. 
Human  nature  is  exceedingly  slow  to  change.  It  simply  can  not  be 
relied  upon,  independently  of  restraint,  to  guard  real  or  lasting 
peace,  or  even  to  prevent  future  wars  far  more  terrible  than  the 
present  one.  The  only  hope  lies  in  authority.  And  this  authority, 
while  it  might  conceivably  rest  on  a  religious  basis,  or  on  human 
reason,  striving  to  escape  from  the  evil  of  war,  must  in  practice, — 
if  past  and  present  lessons  have  any  practical  value  at  all, — be 
established  and  for  some  time  be  maintained  by  adequate  power. 

There  have  been  many  attempts  to  outline,  and  a  number  to 
secure,  the  political  machinery  necessary  for  the  thorough  establish- 
ment of  peace.  In  the  ancient  World,  the  spread  of  Roman  domin- 
ion well  ovSr  the  whole  area  of  contact  and  communication  reduced 
foreign  relations  to  such  relative  unimportance  that  for  a  long  time 
the  Roman  World  enjoyed  practical  peace.  Universality  was  an 
early  and  lasting  hope  of  the  Christian  church,  which  was  fused  with 
the  Roman  tradition  of  temporal  power  to  preserve  the  Holy  Roman 
Empire  through  the  middle  ages. 

The  first  comprehensive  plan  to  insure  the  peace  of  modern 


The  Sole  Condition   of   Permanent   Peace, 

iiurope  was  the  Grand  Design  of  Henry  IV  of  France,  said  to  have 
been  suggested  to  him  by  Elizabeth.  By  the  execution  of  this  plan, 
Europe  would  have  formed  a  sort  of  federation,  governed  by  a 
president  and  a  council  or  senate,  to  be  composed  of  four  repre- 
sentatives from  each  major  power  and  two  from  each  minor  state. 
While  Henry's  plan  would  have  made  the  Hapsburg  emperor  the 
first  head  of  the  new  over-state,  it  would  have  destroyed  all  claim 
10  permanent  imperial  sovereignty,  which  fact,  according  to  an  inti- 
mation of  Penn,  was  responsible  for  his  murder. 

Penn's  scheme,  designed  to  give  Europe  a  chance  to  heal  her- 
self from  the  v/ars  of  the  end  of  the  seventeenth  century,  proposed 
a  "European  Sovereign,  or  Imperial  diet,  Parliament,  or  Estates," 
representation  in  which  was  to  be  in  proportion  to  ability  to  sup- 
port its  financial  burdens.  "But  for  example's  sake,"  Penn  sug- 
gested that  of  the  delegates,  'The  Empire  of  Germany  send  twelve; 
France,  ten;  Spain,  ten;  Italy,  which  comes  to  France,  eight;  Eng- 
land, six;"  etc.,  ninety  in  all.  The  advantages  expected  to  result 
were:  The  saving  of  blood,  which  "recommends  our  expedient 
beyond  all  objections;"  the  enhanced  reputation  of  Christianity;  the 
saving  of  money;  the  preservation  of  towns;  cities  and  countries; 
peace  and  security  of  travel  and  traffic;  protection  against  the 
Turk  (.who  was  to  be  invited  in,  with  ten  delegates)  ;  the  enhance- 
ment of  personal  friendship  between  princes  and  states;  and  a 
chance  for  princes  to  "choose  wives  for  themselves  such  as  they 
love,  and  not  by  proxy  merely  to  gratify  interest." 

The  Abbe  de  St.  Pierre  published  a  few  years  later  the  'Pro- 
ject of  a  treaty  to  make  peace  perpetual,'  a  less  comprehensive 
scheme  than  Penn's,  but  more  widely  known,  and  of  importance 
particularly  because  its  suggestions  reappeared  in  the  organization 
of  the  Holy  Alliance. 

The  condition  of  Europe  just  over  a  century  ago  is  reproduced 
in  essentials  with  singular  fidelity  today.  The  outstanding  feature 
of  the  time  was  exhaustion,  of  men  and  resources,  until  the  am- 
bition for  glory,  and  even  the  hope  of  gain  or  power,  were  giving 
way  to  sickness  of  war  and  hope  of  peace,  France  then,  like  Ger- 
many in  1918,  was  holding  at  bay  a  world  exasperated  by  her  ag- 
gression, determined  to  reduce  her  at  least  to  equality  with  other 
states,  and  too  strong,  in  right  and  in  might,  permanently  to  be 
resisted.  The  parallel  goes  much  farther;  for  example,  to  the 
similarity  of  position  of  Russia  then  and  America  now,  with  re- 
sources almost   intact,   and   to   Alexander's   insistence  that   he   was 


The   Sole   Condition   of   Permanent    Peace. 

warring  on  Napoleon,  but  not  on  the  French  people;  but  it  is  suf- 
ficient to  note  that  the  conditions  cogently  moving  men  to  seek  the 
means  of  lasting  peace  were  the  same  then  as  now. 

A  compact  league  of  the  European  nations,  having  as  its  chief 
function  the  preservation  of  peace,  was  a  life-long  dream  of  the 
Emperor  Alexander.  As  early  as  1804,  he  made  a  definite  propo- 
sition of  this  kind  to  England.  The  first  treaty  between  a  number 
of  powers,  giving  definite  expression  to  this  idea,  was  that  of 
Chaumont,  dated  in  March,  1814,  between  Russia,  Prussia,  Aus- 
tria and  England,  providing  for  war  against  Napoleon,  and  peace 
after  his  overthrow.  By  this  treaty,  each  nation  bound  itself  to  be 
ready  at  any  time  during  the  anticipated  peace  to  contribute  a 
quota  of  sixty  thousand  men,  to  form  a  European  army.  The 
treaty  of  Paris,  shortly  afterward,  was  signed  also  by  France,  Spain, 
Portugal  and  Sweden,  but  these  powers  were  never  admitted  to  the 
inner  circle. of  leaders. 

The  Congress  of  Vienna,  anathematized  of  late  as  history's 
choicest  demonstration  of  unprincipled  national  selfishness,  was 
called  in  the  name  of  peace  and  justice,  and  as  honestly,  on  the 
part  of  many  of  the  participants  or  attendants,  as  any  congress  of 
many  peoples  can  be  expected  to  be  called,  to  provide  and  ensure 
these  ends.  Far  as  it  came  from  providing  justice  to  all  of  Europe, 
it  and  the  succeeding  meetings  and  treaties  at  Paris,  Aix-la-Chapelle, 
etc..  did  still,  in  the  Holy  Alliance  and  the  more  comprehensive 
leagues  of  the  same  years,  provide  for  permanence  of  peace,  as 
earnestly  and  in  as  proper  form  as  could  be  hoped  for  in  any  first 
attempt  on  a  large  scale.  The  act  of  the  Holy  Alliance  provided 
that:  "The  sole  principle  of  force,  whether  between  the  said  Gov- 
ernments or  between  their  subjects,  shall  be  that  of  doing  each 
other  reciprocal  service,  and  of  testifying  by  unalterable  good  will 
the  mutual  affection  with  which  they  ought  to  be  animated,  to 
consider  themselves  all  as  members  of  one  and  the  same  Christian 
nation"  (Quoted  From  Phillips:  The  Confederation  of  Europe, 
p.  302). 

From  the  final  breaking  down  of  this  group  of  leagues,  their 
failure  to  provide  permanent  peace,  and  the  flagrant  injustice 
which  characterized  their  temporary  effectiveness,  it  has  been  us- 
ual to  conclude  that  such  attempts  are  foredoomed  to  failure.  It 
is  undoubtedly  true  that  the  allrances  of  a  century  ago  could  not 
have  accomplished  their  full  professed  aims.  It  may  be  granted 
too  that  no  political  device  could  then  have   realized   Alexander's 

8 


The  Sole   Condition   of   Permanent   Peace. 

dream  of  peace.  But  the  failures,  both  of  realization  and  of  pos- 
sibility, were  for  perfectly  definite  reasons.  None  of  the  causes  of 
failure  pass  our  power  of  definite  understanding,  and  none  of  them 
pass  our  present  power  of  remedy,  if  only  we  will  agree  to  use  our 
present  power. 

The  efforts  to  realize  general  and  lasting  peace  and  justice,  a 
century  ago,  failed  because: 

1.  The  spirit  of  nationalism  and  of  pride  in  national  sov- 
ereignty stood  in  the  way. 

2.  The  political  and  social  differences  between  the  several 
nations  were  too  great  to  admit  of  their  uniform   control. 

3.  All  of  the  attempted  leagues  were  between  rulers,  the  peo- 
ple being  recognized  as  beneficiaries  but  never  as 
participants. 

4.  No  attempted  league  went  far  enough  in  its  practical  aims 
to   make   permanence   possible,    even   if  desirable. 

1.  Pride  in  one's  political  organization,  and  the  enjoyment  of 
this  pride,  are  pure  products  of  education;  any  form  of  hostility 
to  the  members  of  other  political  entities,  as  such,  is  bad  fruit  of 
the  same  tree.  Patriotism  has  served  human  progress,  sometimes 
with  great  effect,  and  will  never  lose  its  value,  but  it  is  not  in 
itself  more  than  a  means  to  an  end.  It  is  good,  in  that  it  con- 
tributes to  personal  and  social  welfare,  and  not  otherwise.  It  is 
one  spirit,  whatever  its  object  of  devotion, — town,  city,  state  or 
nation.  Devotion  to  one  of  these  does  not  exclude  devotion  to  the 
others;  the  best  citizen  of  the  state  is  the  best  citizen  of  his  town 
also.  Devotion  to  all  of  these  is  good,  and  the  more  active  it  is 
the  better.  Every  political  entity  furnishes  a  point  of  application, 
inviting  social  effort.  We  derive  happiness  from  our  particular 
political  associations,  and  they  are  responsible  for  much  of  our 
welfare;  but  it  is  only  reasonable  to  remember  that  other  political 
institutions  might  promote  our  welfare  as  effectively,  and  that  the 
happiness  which  spurs  and  rewards  our  devotion  is  absolutely  de- 
pendent on  our  individual  circumstances.  My  brother  loves 
Colorado,  in  a  way  quite  strange  to  me,  but  is  oddly  unable  to 
appreciate  the  glory  of  California. 

The  point  of  this  is  that  any  material  change  in  the  World's 
political  organization  must  in  its  inception  be  somewhat  uncom- 
fortable to  many  people,  simply  because  it  is  an  innovation 
something  they  are  not  used  to,  because  it  will  take,  or  seem  to 
take,  something  away  from  the  political  organizations  they  are  used 


The   Sole   Condition   of   Permanent    Peace. 

to  cherishing.  We  would  outgrow  this  discomfort  with  time,  and 
our  children  would  accept  the  new  order,  as  that  of  nature,  just 
as  we  do  that  to  which  we  were  brought  up.  And  the  provision  of 
the  most  satisfactory  conditions  for  our  children  is  the  real  end  of 
all  our  efforts. 

Race  feelings,  in  distinction  to  national  feelings,  are  to  some 
extent  innate,  not  the  fruit  of  education  alone.  But  they  can  be 
developed,  or  practically  suppressed,  by  education.  During  the 
greater  part  of  the  history  of  the  United  States,  England  was  the 
bete  noir  of  most  Americans,  in  spite  of  the  racial  identity  of  the 
two  peoples.  Most  racial  likes  and  antipathies  which  attract  atten- 
tion, far  from  being  innate,  are  of  quite  quick  growth,  and  are 
easily  outgrown.  Acquaintance  usually  does  away  with  the  most 
instinctive  racial  antipathies.  Race  pride  is  valuable  when  it  is  a 
spur  to  good  work.  It  is  a  nuisance  when  it  leads  to  refusal  to 
accept  good  things  from  other  races.  The  most  rapid  development 
of  racial  welfare  results  from  the  freest  assimilation  of  whatever  is 
good.  If  at  the  same  time  it  is  possible  to  effectually  regulate  bor- 
rowing, by  such  education  in  mutual  ideas  and  institutions  as  will 
promote  the  general  understanding  of  their  effects,  so  much  the 
better.  The  World  Over-state  should  accomplish  both  of  these 
general   services. 

Nothing  of  value  in  racial  or  national  characteristics,  present  or 
future,  needs  to  be  sacrificed  to  the  creation  of  the  over-state. 
Cases  will  undoubtedly  arise  in  time,  in  which  locally  cherished 
customs  will  be  suppressed,  in  favor  of  others  much  more  generally 
adhered  to;  slavery  and  polygamy  have  been  handled  in  this  way 
in  the  United  States.  Such  interference  is  always  cautious,  never 
occurring  except  in  consequence  of  very  general  conviction  that 
the  custom  condemned  is  essentially  bad.  A  mere  majority  of 
senfiment  can  never  get  a  majority  vote  for  interference.  In  its 
early  years,  a  new  over-state  would  presumably  be  especially  care- 
ful not  to  interfere  with  matters  of  domestic  concern  to  the 
constituent  states;  and  after  the  period  of  its  newness,  such  caution 
surely  would  not  be  abandoned  any  faster  than  confidence  in  the 
propriety  of  the  state's  actions  can  replace  it,  in  avoiding  danger 
of  dissatisfaction. 

National  sovereignty  would  have  to  be  sacrificed  to  the  estab- 
lishment of  an  over-state,  if  it  really  existed.  But  the  fact  is  that 
no  such  thing  is  now  recognized,  except  in  forms  of  speech,  and 
that  hardly  anybody  believes  it  to  exist.     The  last  great  states  to 

10 


The  Sole  Condition   of  Permanent   Peace. 

claim  it,  except  in  verbal  form,  were  China  and  Japan,  both  of 
which  long  since  abandoned  the  claim.  Imperial  Germany  has  acted 
like  a  sovereign  state,  but  still  dared  not  claim  real  sovereignty; 
and  not  even  Germany's  own  people,  while  they  fought  for  her, 
relished  or  approved  her  disregard  of  treaties.  Every  item  of 
recognized  international  law  is  a  limitation  on  the  sovereignty  of 
the  several  nations,  and  every  treaty  further  clouds  the  title  of  the 
participants.  If  the  sacrifice  of  sovereignty  is  in  itself  bad,  the 
evil  must  inhere  also  in  treaties,  particularly  in  treaties  of  alliance 
and  treaties  involving  concessions,  as  practically  all  treaties  do; 
while  international  law  is  worse,  because  it  imposes  an  ill-defined 
cloud  on  every  state's  title  to  sovereignty.  Every  patriot  who 
believes  in  treaties  and  in  their  observance  should  welcome  an 
over-state,  able  to  standardize  treaties  by  incorporating  them  in 
general  laws,  to  construe  them  with  authority,  and  to  guarantee 
their  observance,  and  to  substitute  definite  laws,  with  explicit  sanc- 
tions, for  the  present  body  of  unsanctioned  and  disputed  interna- 
tional law. 

We  may  conclude,  then,  that  there  is  no  national  sovereignty, 
to  be  given  up  when  an  over-state  is  formed.  There  will  be  a  loss 
of  some  of  the  authority  now  exercised  by  the  several  nations,  but 
this  loss,  being  mutual,  and  always  in  favor  of  the  other  states 
enduring  the  same  sacrifice  at  the  same  time,  must  as  an  average 
be  exactly  compensated,  even  while  the  loss  occurs.  It  depends 
only  on  care  in  organization,  to  see  that  the  average  is  not  reached 
by  balancing  big  sacrifices  against  big  gains  by  other  powers. 
This  should  be  almost  automatic.  The  real  sovereignty  of  the 
present  states  is  in  proportion  to  their  might,  and  the  great  states 
would  enter  the  World-state  with  more  or  less  correspondingly 
great  voting  power.  The  kings  and  emperors,  big  and  little,  of 
Napoleon's  time  treated  their  sovereignty  as  something  real.  This 
compelled  the  great  ones  to  treat  many  of  the  little  ones  as  their 
equals,  in  form;  but  in  practice  the  great  ones  refused  to  admit 
the  minor  ones  to  their  more  important  meetings.  With  the  great 
kings  granting  to  the  little  kings  the  claim  of  equality,  but  refusing 
to  make  the  claim  effective,  the  attempt  to  create  a  real  or  durable 
confederation  of  Europe  had  to  fail.  Today  the  situation  is  very 
essentially  different.  The  Englishman  and  Belgian  recognize  each 
other  as  equals,  and  will  be  satisfied  if  they  are  equally  potent  in 
shaping  their  joint  and  several  political  destinies.  The  representa- 
tion of  England  and  Belgium  in  the  World-state's  government  can 

11 


The  Sole  Condition   of   Permanent   Peace. 

and  must  adjust  itself  mechanically.  The  executive  personnel  could 
just  now  be  chosen  with  little  friction.  America  is  glad  to  have 
her  soldiers  commanded  by  an  able  French  general,  without  wait- 
ing for  the  organization  of  an  over-state. 

There  was,  a  century  ago,  no  well  developed  national  feeling 
in  the  great  states  of  Eastern  and  Central  Europe,  and  the  rise  of 
such  a  feeling  in  England  and  France  was  a  chief  obstacle  to 
Alexander's  federation.  England  chose  deliberately  to  "revolve  in 
her  own  orbit."  The  spirit  of  nationalism  has  grown  in  strength, 
but  the  whole  World  knows  now  that  the  orbits  overlap  and  are 
entangled.  The  freest  revolution  of  each  people  in  its  own  orbit 
can  be  hoped  for  only  by  regulation  competent  to  distribute  and 
minimize  the  friction.  Treaties  adjust  the  integration  of  single 
wheels,  and  that  only  while  they  are  observed.  Only  an  over-state, 
with  really  sovereign  authority,  can  regulate  the  whole  World's 
political  organization.  Well  handled,  it  can  promote,  instead  of 
hamper,   each   people's  freedom   of  revolution,    and   evolution. 

2.  The  parties  to  the  peace  efforts  of  a  century  ago  clearly 
understood  that  some  measure  of  political  uniformity  was  essential 
in  the  states  uniting  in  any  cohesive  league.  The  Emperor  Alex- 
ander even  gave  clear  expression  to  his  appreciation  of  the  fact 
that  his  league  might  for  this  reason  be  made  an  instrument  of 
tyranny, — as  actually  happened  in  its  later  days.  Any  state  must 
guarantee  some  measure  of  stability  to  its  constituents,  against 
internal  as  well  as  against  external  enemies;  and  if  the  several 
constituent  states  be  organized  on  too  different  principles,  there 
will  be  too  great  difference  of  opinion,  as  to  what  constitutes  an 
internal  enemy,  to  make  cohesion  possible.  The  other  great  con- 
tinental powers  insisted  on  the  reestablishment  of  a  monarchy  in 
France,  before  they  would  consider  admitting  her  to  their  concert; 
and  the  first  crises  of  their  league  arose  over  revolutions  in  Spain, 
Naples  and  Greece.  The  difference  in  the  practice  of  government 
between  England  and  her  allies  was  largely  responsible  for  Eng- 
land's refusal  to  join  the  Holy  Alliance,  although  it  was  not  until 
years  later  that  the  British  ministry  became  legally  responsible  to 
the  people  or  to  their  chosen  representatives. 

The  present  war  is  a  conclusive  demonstration  of  the  incom- 
patability  of  too  different  government.  Whether  or  not  we  are 
at  war  with  the  German  people,  we  certainly  would  never  have 
had  to  go  to  war  if  they  had  had  our  kind  of  government.  The 
nations  of  the  World  cannot  live  together,  half  monarchical-aristo- 

12 


The  Sole   Condition   of   Permanent   Peace. 

cratic  and  half  free.  The  monarchs  of  Russia,  Austria  and  Prussia 
knew  this,  when  they  reestablished  kings  in  Spain,  France  and 
Naples,  and  recently  insisted  on  one  for  Norway.  The  proposition 
that  Germany's  form  of  government  is  none  of  our  business  is 
directly  contrary  to  fact.  Germany's  form  of  government,  not 
merely  the  personality  of  her  rulers,  has  made  her  a  World  men- 
ace, and  we  will  be  well  within  our  evident  rights  in  insisting  that 
she  adopt  a  form  of  government  that  will  make  her  a  safe  neigh- 
bor. The  necessary  measure  of  uniformity  is  realized  by  making 
government  responsible  to  the  people,  subject  to  their  sanction 
without  appeal  to  violence,  and,  at  least  in  effect,  by  their  chosen 
agents.  These  demands  are  practically  met  already  by  every 
important  power  in  the  World,  except  Germany,  Austria  and  Tur- 
key. In  this  respect,  then,  the  condiitons  working  against  the  con- 
federation of  Europe  a  century  ago  have  been  very  generally  out- 
grown, and  the  change  should  be  complete  when  this  war  is  for- 
mally ended. 

Too  great  compulsory  uniformity  is  undesirable.  It  would  be 
sure  to  stand  in  the  way  of  progress;  and,  however  well  our  various 
forms  and  degrees  of  popular  government  may  satisfy  us,  we  have 
no  reason  to  suppose  that  our  descendents  in  another  century  will 
not  have  outgrown  them.  The  over-state  should  be  plastic  enough 
to  permit  progress,  regulating  it  only  so  far  as  to  make  it  orderly, 
without  occasion  for  the  destructive  revolutions  which  have  some- 
times been  among  its  features. 

3.  A  league  of  sovereign  rulers,  guaranteeing  internal  stability 
to  the  constituent  states,  had  in  the  nature  of  the  case  to  oppose 
progress  toward  political  liberality.  This  was  exactly  the  operation 
of  the  Holy  Alliance,  the  last  work  of  which  was  Russian  inter- 
ference to  crush  a  liberal  movement  in  Hungary.  The  tendency 
of  government  in  Europe  a  century  ago,  as  in  all  the  World  now, 
was  toward  popular  government,  and  a  league  standing  against 
this  movement  had  eventually  to  fail.  The  future  over-state  will 
be  a  union  of  peoples,  not  of  ruling  individuals  or  classes.  The 
heads  of  states,  even  where  there  are  hereditary  limited  monarchies, 
will  necessarily  reflect  and  assist  in  popular  progress.  This  obstacle 
to  the  success  of  a  World  state  has  been  outgrown,  very  completely. 

4.  As  has  just  been  indicated,  the  aims  of  the  old  European 
leagues,  in  that  they  undertook  to  conserve  institutions  in  defiance 
of  progress,  made  the  endurance  of  the  leagues  impossible.  Beyond 
not  standing  in  the  way  of  progress,  and  beyond  being  itself  a  step 

13 


The   Sole   Condition   of   Permanent    Peace. 

in  progress,  a  general  league  capable  of  enduring  must  constitu- 
tionally favor  progress.  The  recognized  aim  of  government  is  now 
the  welfare  of  the  people;  the  only  differences  of  opinion  are  as  to 
what  constitutes  welfare  and  how  it  may  best  be  promoted.  While 
old  attempts  at  confederation  professed  to  seek  the  welfare  of  the 
people,  these  professions  were  too  largely  verbal;  there  were  no 
specific  attempts  to  promote  it  (aside  from  abstaining  or  planning 
to  abstain  from  war),  no  provision  of  political  machinery  for  its 
promotion,  no  single  joint  efforts  or  agencies  of  any  kind  to  favor 
it.  The  keeping  of  peace  was  certainly  in  the  interest  of  the  people, 
as  well  as  of  their  rulers,  but  a  single  benefit,  however  great,  is  not 
sufficient  service  to  make  any  general  political  establishment  per- 
manent. The  new  over-state  will  in  practice  as  well  as  in  profes- 
sion aim  at  human  improvement  in  any  and  every  practicable  way. 
Jt  must  be  expected  to  escape  the  fate  of  previous  leagues,  by 
earning  permanence.  Social  improvement  must  be  one  of  its  out- 
standing activities. 

From  the  study  of  the  causes  of  failure  of  the  peace  efforts  at 
the  close  of  the  Napoleonic  era,  we  conclude,  then,  that  an  im- 
portant part  of  these  causes  no  longer  exist;  and  that  so  far  as 
conditions  which  might  make  a  permanent  league  or  union  difficult 
have  not  been  outgrown,  they  can  be  made  inoperative,  or  con- 
verted into  factors  contributing  to  the  success  of  an  over-state,  by 
the  exercise  of  judgment  in  the  formation  and  operation  of  the 
union.  The  same,  and  only  these,  general  reasons  are  advanced 
in  discouragement  of  similar  efforts  to-day. 

Prior  to  the  war,  the  most  notable  recent  attempts  to  insure 
World  peace  were  those  associated  with  and  growing  out  of  the 
Hague  conferences  and  tribunal.  These  resulted  in  real  progress 
toward  a  recognized  code  of  international  law,  but  failed  essen- 
tially when  the  control  of  policy  was  attempted.  The  basic  diffi- 
culty of  the  entire  Hague  undertaking  was  lack  of  authority,  with 
the  necessary  backing  of  power  or  force.  This  fact  is  not  less 
clear  and  significant  because  the  state  which  led  in  refusal  to  limit 
armaments  and  to  require  arbitration  was  the  one  which  eventually 
wrecked  the  whole  effort  to  preserve  peace.  A  court  without  the 
power  to  enforce  its  decisions  must  always  fail  when  it  is  most 
needed.  In  time  of  peace,  before  it  was  generally  suspected  that 
our  whole  civilization  was  in  danger  from  lack  of  control  of  World 
politics,  there  seemed  to  be  a  fair  chance  that  the  Hague  confer- 
ences and  tribunal  would  serve  as  a  nucleus,  around  which  addi- 

14 


The   Sole   Condition   of   Permanent    Peace. 

tional   political   structures  would   grow   up   as  their  need   might   be 
felt.     We  know  better  now. 

A  firm  league  for  the  suppression  of  German  violence  already 
exists.  As  it  has  advanced  from  a  mere  alliance  to  a  league,  with 
centralized  military  authority,  it  has  gained  conspicuously  in  effec- 
tiveness. Under  the  stress  of  war,  the  necessity  of  close  concert 
makes  such  a  league  effective,  but  in  the  safety  of  peace  it  pre- 
sently disintegrates.  The  Grand  Alliance  suppressed  Napoleon, 
but  fell  apart  when  it  had  no  common  enemy.  ;A  very  much  more 
complete  union  is  wanted  now.  The  words,  alliance,  league,  con- 
federation or  confederacy  and  union,  denote  degrees  of  fusion  in 
purpose  and  political  form.  The  distinction  between  a  confedera- 
tion and  a  union,  and  the  positive  advantages  of  the  union,  were 
elaborated  in  theory  and  on  the  basis  of  experience  with  a  confed- 
eration, by  Hamilton  and  Madison,  in  the  series  of  papers  known 
collectively  as  the  Federalist.  Their  arguments  have  lost  nothing 
with  time,  and  should  be  widely  read  and  studied  now.  American 
experience  with  both  confederation  and  union  leaves  no  room  for 
doubt,  where  it  is  understood,  that  for  every  function  of  a  state, 
union  is  preferable  to  mere  confederation.  For  the  same  reasons, 
either  of  these  is  more  effective  than  such  informal  and  transient 
associations  as  the  alliance  and  league. 

If  stable  peace  were  the  only  object  of  forming  'an  over-state, 
it  would  have  to  have  a  well  organized  government,  complete  and 
powerful  enough  to  command  resources,  test  its  own  fairness,  man- 
age the  World's  armaments,  and  properly  use  them  or  hold  them 
ready  for  use.  These  functions  alone  would  require  a  real  union. 
But  the  provision  of  stable  peace  will  be  far  easier,  surer  and 
more  economical,  if  the  over-state  is  constituted  with  much  broader 
powers  and  functions.  It  should  obviously  be  able  to  regulate  the 
conditions  which  without  control  may  lead  to  dangerous  rivalry, 
discord  and  enmity,  and  through  these  tend  toward  war. 

While  there  remain  no  too  serious  general  diificulties  in  the 
way  of  World  confederation  or  union, — and  this  fact  is  evidenced 
by  recent  expressions  of  favorable  attitude  toward  it  in  various 
lands, — conflicting  interests  of  the  various  nations  do  remain,  and 
these  will  arise  as  so  many  difficulties  in  detail,  which  will  have 
to  be  overcome  in  order  to  secure  the  necessary  hearty  cooperation 
of  the  individual  nations.  The  natural  first  positive  step  toward 
a   union   is  the   assembling   of   a   preliminary   congress,    which   will 

15 


The  Sole  Condition   of   Permanent   Peace, 

presumably  deliberate  for  a  considerable  time,  and  in  which  the 
problems  to  be  settled  in  the  interest  of  the  most  general  satisfac- 
tion will  all  be  presented,  and  adjusted  as  well  as  possible.  The 
most  difficult  problems  will  concern  the  scope  of  power  of  the 
central  government,  and  the  basis  of  representation.  The  latter 
question  may  arise  even  in  the  summoning  or  actions  of  the  pre- 
liminary congress. 

In  some  way,  representation  in  the  World  government  must  of 
course  be  made  a  matter  of  mathematical  determination.  Even  if 
it  could  be  settled  arbitrarily,  by  agreement,  in  the  first  place,  no 
such  agreement  could  be  permanently  satisfactory;  and  it  is  likely 
that  whatever  formula  is  adopted  to  determine  representation  will 
need  to  be  modified  in  time.  Alexander  expected  the  existing 
states  to  enter  his  confederation  as  coordinate  units;  the  great  ma- 
jority of  the  delegates  to  the  Vienna  Congress  went  with  that  idea, 
but  the  business  there  was  all  done  by  an  inner  circle  of  the  great 
powers.  Penn  would  apparently  have  made  the  basis  of  representa- 
tion financial.  It  may  safely  be  assumed  that  no  single  basis 
of  representation, — present  sovereignty,  population,  wealth  or 
power, — will  be  satisfactory.  Professor  Laughlin,  in  the  Scientific 
Magazine  for  December,  1916,  suggests  representation  on  the  basis 
of  population,  literacy  (share  in  the  World's  work),  area  in  use, 
potentially  useful  area  and  international  trade,  to  be  weighted : 
potentially  valuable  area,  6%;  area  in  use,  10%;  total  population, 
10%;  literate  population,  25%;  and  foreign  commerce,  50%.  He 
also  touches  on  the  especially  difficult  problem  of  representation  of 
or  because  of  dependencies.  It  would  seem  better  to  base  repre- 
sentation in  part  directly  on  national  wealth,  and  to  cut  down 
materially  the  allotment  to  foreign  commerce.  While  any  discus- 
sion of  these  details  is  needless  here,  two  observations  will  suggest 
the  relation  between  the  functions  of  the  over-state  and  the  com- 
position  of  the  governing  body. 

If  a  chief  service  of  a  confederacy  is  the  protection  of  its 
constituents  in  their  external  commerce,  and  if  its  revenues  are 
largely  derived,  directly  or  indirectly,  from  taxation  of  this  com- 
merce, these  may  be  reasons  for  weighting  it  fairly  heavily  in 
making  the  formula  by  which  representation  is  decided.  Also, 
some  weighing  of  international  trade,  independent  of  the  extent  to 
which  the  over-state  may  assume  its  control,  is  expedient,  to  en- 
courage it  for  the  mere  sake  of  international  intercourse. 

For  a  similar  reason,  the  proposition  to  weight  trained  popula- 

16 


The  Sole  Condition   of   Permanent   Peace. 

lation,  rather  than  total  population,  is  a  good  one;  a  settled  formula 
with  this  feature  will  tend  powerfully  to  make  every  state  train  its 
citizens.  Beyond  such  encouragement,  the  over-state  should  make 
the  training  of  the  people  one  of  its  direct  functions.  The  time  is 
probably  not  far  off  when  education  will  be  the  most  important 
single  function  of  every  state.  Germany's  demonstration  of  what 
can  be  accomplished  by  misdirected  education  is  far  more  than 
sufficient  proof  that  once  an  over-state  is  established,  and  given 
a  chance  to  use  education  properly  on  a  World  scale,  the  difficulties 
which  may  attend  its  foundation  will  be  safely  and  very  definitely 
passed. 

The  general  idea  of  World  union  is  so  sound,  the  advantages  of 
union  so  overwhelmingly  exceed  the  difficulties,  and  appreciation 
of  these  facts  is  already  so  general,  that  some  kind  of  World  union 
is  almost  sure  to  result  from  the  present  conflict.  It  may  come 
before  or  after  a  treaty  of  peace.  It  might  well  have  come  even 
before  an  armistice.  In  fixing  the  time  which  would  be  best,  the 
determining  consideration  is  the  probable  effect  of  union  in  perma- 
nent form  on  the  consummation  of  immediate  peace.  If  the  difficul- 
ties in  detail,  which  are  likely  to  arise  when  formal  union  is  under- 
taken, are  serious  enough  to  be  likely  to  lead  to  serious  discord,  the 
attempt  may  be  allowed  to  await  the  signing  of  treaties;  peace  has 
to  be  won  before  it  is  made  permanent.  But  if  the  free  nations 
of  the  World  are  agreed  that  the  most  perfect  harmony  of  effort 
is  needed  to  make  complete  victory  certain,  then  objections  that 
might  seem  serious  to  individual  states  at  another  time  may  be 
allowed  to  sleep,  for  the  sake  of  the  more  urgent  advantages  of 
union;  and  if  objections  sleep,  they  are  likely  not  to  awaken. 

There  is  no  doubt  at  all  that,  once  in  operation,  a  union  can 
wage  war  or  make  peace  more  effectively  than  can  a  group  of 
allies.  This  is  not  alone  because  of  the  value  of  general  martial 
unity,  and  unity  of  financial  effort.  The  provision  of  food  and 
other  supplies  to  our  allied  armies  and  the  people  behind  them  has 
improved  in  efficiency  as  control  has  been  centralized,  and  could 
surely  be  made  more  perfect  under  permanent  supreme  authority. 
But  the  greatest  value  to  be  realized  from  union,  since  we  already 
have  a  measure  of  some  of  its  advantages  in  centralized  general- 
ship and  financial  policy,  would  be  psychological.  Union  in  definite 
form  would  remove  any  suspicion  anywhere  that  the  armies  of 
freedom  may  be  inadequate,  any  lurking  fear  that,  with  the  collapse 
of  the  German  Empire,  an  end  may  come  to  their  support;  it  would 

17 


The  Sole   Condition   of  Permanent   Peace. 

end  all  danger  of  a  peace  by  compromise,  leaving  intrigue,  faith- 
lessness and  the  ambition  of  single  men  free  to  prepare  again;  it 
would  fuse  and  enthuse  our  armies,  in  a  way  beyond  the  reach 
of  mere  unity  of  plan  and  command. 

If  we  had  been  one  union,  German  propaganda  would  have 
had  a  different  chance  in  Russia.  The  same  condition  would  dis- 
pose of  Bolshevik  propaganda  now.  A  union  of  peoples  could 
hardly  have  included  old  Russia,  but  Russia  after  the  first  revo- 
lution would  have  been  perfectly  at  home  in  it.  That  milk  was 
spilt,  but  there  is  more  in  Russia.  German  and  Bolshevik  intrigue 
elsewhere  would  be  nullified  by  prompt  union.  The  Orient  has 
been  hardly  more  than  nominally  in  the  war,  and  has  had  some 
excuse  if  it  saw  a  limited  reason  for  great  exertion.  But  China 
would  be  prompt  to  see  salvation  in  World  union,  and  could  become 
a  willing  and  potent  factor  in  guarding  peace.  Japan  has  not 
China's  need  of  protection  by  union,  but  is  wise  enough  to  prefer 
security  in  eventual  enduring  peace  to  safety  at  the  cost  of  con- 
stant readiness  for  war.  Her  past  policies  have  been  distinctly  of 
the  German  type,  and  have  had  to  be,  to  make  her  safe.  Remodel 
World  politics,  so  that  her  own  might  in  war  is  not  needed  to  insure 
her  survival  and  progress,  and  no  people  will  find  more  relief  in 
disarmament. 

One  of  the  greatest  reasons  for  promptness  of  union  is  its 
effect  on  Germany.  Her  people  would  have  nothing  left  to  fight 
for  or  to  wrangle  over.  Even  if  she  has  hoped  to  conquer  the 
World  piece-meal,  she  could  have  no  hope  of  conquering,  or  even 
resisting  it,  permanently  united.  To  stage  a  series  of  revolutions 
while  she  gropes  for  terms,  just  as  to  go  on  fighting  in  the  hope  of 
a  draw,  would  be  to  court  final  peaceful  isolation,  with  no  further 
prospect  than  accelerated  relapse  into  complete  helplessness.  Richly 
as  Germany  has  earned  punishment,  and  bitter  against  her  as  the 
allied  peoples  properly  are,  none  of  them  will  balk  at  a  treaty  with- 
out revenge  (in  distinction,  of  course,  to  restitution),  whenever 
peace  can  be  trusted.  The  German  war-lords  had  abundant  selfish 
reason  to  oppose  World  union  of  peoples,  but  the  German  people 
have  none;  and  German  business  interests,  without  the  support  of 
which  the  war  party  would  always  have  been  helpless,  are  already 
hunting  for  any  cover,  faced  by  a  loosely  united  World,  The 
German  people  could  not  refuse  an  opportunity  to  enter  a  union, — 
as  France  entered  the  European  concert  after  the  Napoleonic  wars. 
To  refuse  Germany  a  chance  to  enter,  even  as  a  democracy,  would 

18 


The   Sole   Condition   of   Permanent    Peace. 

justify  the  claim  of  her  rulers,  that  she  had  to  fight  for  a  place  in 
the  sun.  Offer  her  admittance  on  the  same  terms  as  other  peoples, 
so  far  as  her  own  proper  soil  and  people  are  concerned,  and  this 
excuse  vanishes.  And  the  German  people  are  weary  enough  to 
jump  at  the  opportunity.  Relieve  her  of  even  the  chance  to  be 
crushed  by  her  own  armament,  and  the  Germans  will  have  a  better 
place  than  their  past  or  present  prospects  let  them  hope  for. 

For  the  allies,  victorious  as  they  definitely  are,  the  war  is  at 
best  only  in  its  last  stage;  it  is  not  finished.  It  is  true  that  a  succes- 
sion of  skilful  extensions  of  an  armistice  originally  thorough  in  its 
provisions  is  malcing  it  impossible  for  any  German  government  to 
think  of  returning  to  arms.  But  beside  more  or  less  difficult  details 
to  be  settled,  we  have  still  to  provide  for  the  fulfillment  of  the 
terms  of  whatever  treaty  may  be  imposed  on  Germany,  and  to 
guard  against  both  anarchy  and  the  spread  of  class  tyranny.  Ger- 
many can  never  pay  for  the  damage  she  has  wrought.  Whatever 
bill  for  damage  may  be  drawn  up,  the  real  tasks  are  deciding  what 
can  be  collected  and  collecting  it.  A  German  government  might 
be  made  to  agree  to  almost  anything,  regardless  of  what  it  can 
deliver.  We  have  no  practical  experience  with  national  insolvency, 
and  can  have  no  confidence  in  anticipating  its  effects.  But  of  these 
two  facts  we  may  be  quite  sure:  That  we  will  be  in  a  better  position 
to  judge  Germany's  ability,  and  the  quality  of  her  efforts  to  pay, 
and  much  better  able  to  assist  or  compel  .her  to  pay  what  she  rea- 
sonably can,  if  she  is  under  an  over-state  in  which  her  creditors 
have  the  majority  vote,  than  if  she  is  left  the  form  of  sovereignty, 
so  that  supervision  must  be  foreign  in  both  form  and  fact;  and 
that  Germany's  power  to  pay  is  further  decreased  by  every  internal 
revolution,  outbreak  or  riot.  For  our  own  sakes,  we  must  insure 
government  in  Germany.  An  over-state  will  provide  an  orderly 
method;   without   it,    war   will   remain   our   only   recourse. 

Bolshevism  is  just  as  much  the  tyranny  of  a  class  as  was  Ger- 
man imperialism,  and  is  an  even  more  insidious  menace  to  our 
democracy.  It  certainly  does  not  represent  any  proper  step  in 
human  progress.  An  over-state  could  prevent  it,  by  guarding 
against  the  ignorance,  misery  and  hopelessness  which  are  respon- 
sible for  it,  and  would  have  orderly  and  proper  means  of  suppress- 
ing it  where  it  already  exists,  in  subordinate  states,  guaranteed  the 
support  of  representative  government.  We  know  that  it  is  a  most 
dangerous  neighbor,  but  do  not  know  what  to  do  with  it  in  a  foreign 
state.     Form  an  over-state  and  the  threat  of  it  will  vanish. 

19 


The  Sole  Condition   of   Permanent   Peace. 

The  sole  condition  of  permanent  peace  is  World  union.  As 
the  nations  should  unite,  in  order  to  secure  the  blessings  of  perma- 
nent peace,  they  should  form  a  union  promptly,  in  order  to  realize 
the  prospect  of  any  peace. 


20 


mm 


572072 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CAUFORNIA  UBRARY 


